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I
How variably Richard Wright, the ﬁ rst black American literary superstar, 
has been focused by so many people and scholars over the course of decades? 
He has been radically discussed in the light of critical theories such as post-
structuralism, postmodernism, feminism, and postcolonialism. Finally, in 
winter, 2006, Wright was discussed in the framework of ecocriticism by Scott 
Hicks in his “W.E.B. Du Bois, Booker T. Washington, and Richard Wright 
— Toward an Ecocriticism of Color.” Unsuccessfully, I have been groping the 
way of synthesizing the paradigm of problems in the study of Wright; how-
ever, Wright studies seem to have totally gone beyond what has been supposed 
before. While the paradigm of problems in the study of Wright has been 
studied by many scholars, none of them seems ever to have suited my con-
cerns. My greatest concern is whether there can be any speciﬁ c way to feel 
closer to Wright and to share his mentality, his way of thinking, living and 
feeling. In other words, while searching for the way to synthesize the study of 
Richard Wright, in eﬀ ect, how to get rid of the reader’s defeated feelings 
caused by Wright’s works has been groped. In the process of analyzing the 
message of Th e Outsider and Wright’s existentialism, a key concept in order to 
bridge the immense gap between Wright and the reader is naturally led; it is 
the Other. Th e present exploration begins with a look at Th e Outsider.
Th e Outsider is permeated with Wright’s philosophy in praise of freedom as 
a human being. It is not diﬃ  cult to imagine that Wright, who thought of his 
own freedom seriously, was keenly aware of being controlled by his environ-
ment, his world in which he lived, and the existence of the people there. Th e 
Outsider reveals to us, at one and the same time, that Wright was shocked to 
discover that he had to live among the Other, who infringed on his freedom 
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— and that he ﬁ nally understood this. Th e text of Th e Outsider, in which 
Wright’s plot, Cross Damon’s story, and the narrator’s description show an-
other aspect of Wright’s life and his literary world, has an attractive power; 
Wright’s valiant challenge to the world and to himself to overcome his hostile 
environment is completely comprehensible, so that Wright’s brand of existen-
tialism is naturally to be understood as an inevitable consequence. Further-
more, his inescapable involvement in the Other will be easily realized.
Th e principal structure that underlies Th e Outsider is Cross’s challenges as 
an existential hero through his various conﬂ icts with the Other. Th e Other is 
one of the main existential issues of several existentialists such as de Beauvoir, 
Camus, Dostoyevsky, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre. It does not 
seem diﬃ  cult to contend that the idea of the Other can be a clue to analyzing 
and clarifying Wright’s literary world, his existentialism, and his life; in other 
words, Wright as a whole can be seen in terms of the Other.
Wright was born in the white-dominated America of early twentieth-
century Mississippi, which was an explicit and undeniable Other for him, and 
vice versa; that is, his relation to the white America of Mississippi consisted of 
ambivalent familiarity and distantiality. To love the other persons as represen-
tations of the Other or despise them, to hate those who are the Other or envy 
them: these opposing emotions toward the Other evoked his imaginative writ-
ing, which embodied his challenge to the world and to himself to express his 
strong will to recognize, comply with and overcome those who are the Other 
even if they violated his freedom.
Wright’s relation to existentialism has been focused on, commented on, and 
criticized since 1946, when he ﬁ rst visited France. Naturally, at ﬁ rst, critics 
dealt with Wright’s impression of French existentialism, his relation to the 
French existentialists, including Jean-Paul Sartre, and points of comparison 
and contrast between Wright and the French existentialists. Although I have 
counted one hundred forty-four items of commentary and criticism on the 
subject of Wright’s existentialism, most of these are still within the framework 
of the earlier trends. For example, in her “Notes Preliminary to a Full Study of 
the Work of Richard Wright,” Constance Webb, in 1946, in a discussion of 
Wright’s relation to French existentialism and a comparison of Wright and 
Sartre, summarizes the trend of criticism concerning the existential world 
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view in Wright’s novels: “Like the French Existentialists he writes of dread, 
nausea, tension and pain. Th e Existentialists explain Wright, and Wright 
explains the Existentialists” (163). No criticism on Wright’s relation to the 
French existentialists is more valid than this statement of Webb’s on Richard 
Wright. It is noteworthy that this remark of Webb’s was made before the 
publication of Th e Outsider; critics’ references to Wright’s existentialism began 
to proliferate only after the publication of Th e Outsider.
If we argue the Other as a key concept at all, we ought to discuss racial 
Otherness of black people in general and dual Otherness of black women in 
general, which, as is well-known, have become the subjected subjects of so 
much contemporary scholarly investigation in the midst of the multicultural 
movement. Nonetheless, our contention is not to discuss American racism by 
the Other as Edward Said tries to understand Orientalism as a discourse by 
examining the interdependent relationship between Europe and the Orient as 
“one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other” (Orientalism 1). 
It should be said at once that our argument depends neither upon an exhaus-
tive catalogue of texts dealing with the Other nor upon a clearly delimited set 
of texts, authors, and ideas that together make up the Other canon.
Needless to say, the Other is deﬁ ned as an existential term in this paper, 
operating as a self-contained system of diﬀ erence. Th e Other as used here 
signiﬁ es the other person or another person or other persons, one’s environ-
ment, one’s situation, indeed even whatever within oneself causes one to sense 
or question his or her existence or identity or self. Accordingly, the term the 
Other in this paper encompasses either a singular other or a plural others. Th e 
concept of the Other will enable us to clarify the existential structure of the 
protagonist’s psychology, a structure through which he must necessarily iden-
tify those people and that outside himself with the Other, the entity which 
inevitably exists in relationship to his Being and to his self.
Yoshinobu Hakutani’s “Richard Wright’s Th e Outsider and Albert Camus’s 
Th e Stranger” (1989) is clearly dependent on his basic understanding that 
Wright’s existentialism is not superﬁ cial and aﬀ ects all aspects of Wright’s 
literary world; in addition, Hakutani stresses the diﬀ erences between the two 
novels. His detailed comparison of the two books through various key words 
such as heredity, environment, chance, determinism, crime, guilt, and absur-
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dity, will serve as a brilliant model for comparison. Our discussion is limited 
to the better understanding of Wright’s individuality and heterogeneity, 
through comparing Wright’s Th e Outsider and Camus’s L’Étranger.
II
In 1958, Charles I. Glicksberg reviewed Th e Outsider in his “Existentialism 
in Th e Outsider” and “Th e God of Fiction”; he argues that Wright’s novel is 
strongly inﬂ uenced by Sartre and Camus, especially by the latter’s Th e Rebel. 
He asserts that Wright uses the premise set forth in Th e Rebel: “What happens 
to the nihilist who has lost all faith in God and has dedicated himself to the 
worship of power?” (18). In 1959, Richard Lehan, in his “Camus’ American 
Aﬃ  nities,” had this to say about Cross Damon in the last part of the article:
Wright’s Cross Damon, the hero of Th e Outsider, may owe his concep-
tion in part to Meursault, although Wright documents his novel more 
from Sartre’s than Camus’ version of existentialism. A cosmic brother of 
Meursault and Caligula, Damon feels outside the course of man and 
society. He is the demonic hero (implied in his very name) who usurps 
God’s place and privilege. His satanic impulses engage him in a head-
long rush toward death (coincidentally, Meursault in French means 
“death leap” — “meurt-saut”). (268)
While Lehan’s explanation seems to be adequate, it is greatly regrettable to see 
such a facile comment on Th e Outsider; in other words, the complexities of 
Cross Damon’s existential character are not likely to be made clear. In contrast 
to Lehan, Kingsley Widmer is more understanding; he sees the novel as in-
debted to Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Sartre. However, Widmer puts exces-
sive stress on Wright’s pessimism.
In 1971, Lewis A. Lawson, in his “Cross Damon: Kierkegaardian Man of 
Dread,” analyzed the use of Kierkegaardian concepts, especially dread, in Th e 
Outsider, criticizing Kingsley Widmer’s treatment of Kierkegaard:
Although most critics argue that Richard Wright derives much of the 
conceptual material for his fable in Th e Outsider (1953) from Camus 
and Sartre, Kingsley Widmer notes that he also employs the “organizing 
concept of Kierkegaardian ‘dread’.” But although Widmer mentions the 
inﬂ uence of Kierkegaard in the novel, he apparently does not regard it as 
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a signiﬁ cant factor, for he mentions it only in passing. If anything, Wid-
mer feels that a rigid adherence to ideas from Kierkegaard damages the 
structure of the novel. A close analysis of Wright’s use of Kierkegaard’s 
work, especially Th e Concept of Dread, is helpful, however, in demon-
strating that Wright is oﬀ ering essentially a Christian, rather than an 
atheistic existential view. (298)
After having indicated that Th e Concept of Dread and Th e Sickness unto Death 
constitutes the primary philosophical sources of Th e Outsider, Lawson con-
cludes: “With the disappearance of his urge to be as God, Cross can once 
again be as man and even begin to grope toward a relationship with God” 
(316). One can agree with his conclusion that Cross ﬁ nally stops trying to be 
as God; for Cross will realize the nature of his relationship to the Other, in-
cluding God.
In 1973, a Japanese scholar, Hiroshi Kaname, published studies of Cross 
Damon’s purpose in life in accord with his version of existentialism. In his 
analysis, freedom from God becomes a burden for Cross; in the end Cross 
realizes that freedom lies in solidarity. One accepts Kaname’s conclusion that 
Cross has not given up hope. As has already been observed, numerous com-
mentaries and criticisms on Wright’s existentialism in Th e Outsider have been 
issued so far; none of them, however, focus on the Other. Some of them 
nearly get to the concept of the Other but fail to understand its signiﬁ cance in 
Th e Outsider: it is very unfortunate that Amrtijit Singh, for example, in his 
“Richard Wright’s Th e Outsider: Existentialist Exemplar or Critique?” (1984), 
appears either to mistake “the whole man” for the Other or to fail to under-
stand “the whole man” as the Other: “It is a compound irony of Wright’s plot 
and theme that Cross’s choice involves the whole man in a perverted, macabre 
way — it involves remaking the man himself ” (363). Th is is no compound 
irony but a simple truth in terms of the existential Other because Wright fully 
understands that no one can exchange his own existence for that of the Other 
and that everyone needs the Other.
Wright begins Th e Outsider at a point in which the elements of his hero’s 
distantiality from the Other has already conspired to bring about Cross’s 
ultimate dread. Th e seeds of Cross’s dread are rooted in his diﬀ erence from 
the Other. Consequently, quite early in Book One, Cross’s distance from the 
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Other becomes the essential element of the dramatic action through which 
Cross’s characterization unfolds.
In Th e Outsider, the narrator variedly uses anxiety, fear, terror, dread, and 
despair to show how Cross treats and responds to the Other or a given situa-
tion. Cross is haunted by a pervasive sense of uneasiness and insecurity which 
he labels fear, dread, and anxiety. Th ese terms are not wholly interchangeable, 
since fear is not to be confused with Angst (translated as either dread or anxi-
ety). Kierkegaard is mentioned among the readings of Cross. Kierkegaard’s 
Concept of Anxiety, which is quoted as an epigraph to Book One of Th e Out-
sider, succinctly diﬀ erentiates dread from fear:
Th erefore, I must point out that it [dread] is altogether diﬀ erent from 
fear and similar concepts that refer to something deﬁ nite, whereas anxi-
ety is freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility. For this reason, 
anxiety is not found in the beast, precisely because by nature the beast is 
not qualiﬁ ed as spirit. (42)
Th at “anxiety is freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility” is para-
phrased: “Th e possible corresponds exactly to the future. For freedom, the 
possible is the future, and the future is for time the possible. To both of these 
corresponds anxiety in the individual life” (91). Anxiety is freedom’s possibil-
ity. Once one sinks into possibility, one cannot sense that one is just as good 
as the Other.
III
Th e principal structure that underlies Th e Outsider is Cross’s trials as an 
existential hero through his various conﬂ icts with those Other. Th e various 
and ﬂ exible interrelationship not only among Cross, Wright, the narrator, the 
female characters, Houston, and the reader, but also between Cross and the 
Communists, or the other minor characters, should be discussed.
Among these relationships, New York City District Attorney Ely Houston 
is taken up in this paper because Houston, who happens to meet Cross for the 
ﬁ rst time on the train for New York and to whom Cross renders his deathbed 
confession for the murders of Herndon, Blount, Hilton, and his former 
Chicago companion, Th omas, as well as his complicity in Eva’s suicide, is a 
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hunched-backed man, one who recognizes himself to be an outsider, as we see 
from what he says to Cross: “‘My personal situation in life has given me a 
vantage point from which I’ve gained some insight into the problems of other 
excluded people’” (499).
As soon as he is introduced to Houston, Cross becomes ﬁ lled with fear: “A 
District Attorney? Th e Ely Houston of whom he had heard? Th e celebrated 
crime-buster [ . . . ]? At once his tensions began to deform the look of the 
world” (497). Cross has murdered Joe Th omas only the day before yesterday, 
so that he doubts that Houston has got on the train to apprehend and arrest 
him. Th e narrator conveys Cross’s ambivalent ﬁ rst impression of Houston:
[ . . . ] he felt intuitively that this [Houston] was the kind of man whom 
he had to fear not only because he was a defender of the law, but because 
Houston had an ability to delve into life. He was afraid of this man and 
yet his fear made him want to know him. (498)
At ﬁ rst Houston appears as an Other who makes Cross feel his criminality, 
and then he gradually becomes a helper to Cross in analyzing his psychologi-
cal structure. Th e reader can easily identify Cross with Houston’s hypothetical 
questioning Negro man in this picture Houston paints of him:
“But their [Negroes’] getting those elementary things [the right to jobs 
and living space] is so long and drawn out that they must, while they 
wait, adjust themselves to living in a a kind of No-Man’s Land . . . Now, 
imagine a man inclined to think, to probe, to ask questions. Why, he’d 
be in a wonderful position to do so, would he not, if he were black and 
lived in America? A dreadful objectivity would be forced upon him.” 
(500)
What does “a dreadful objectivity” mean? Wright has Houston deﬁ ne Cross as 
an objective man, neither an insider nor an outsider, who lives in a “No-Man’s 
Land.” Th e narrator helps the reader to recognize Cross’s existential way of 
thinking by describing Cross’s reaction to Houston’s remarks. Th e narrator 
implies that Cross is aware — unconsciously or consciously — of the existen-
tial fact that he cannot exchange his existence for the existence of the Other by 
changing his name or exchanging his situation, for, as Heidegger puts it, man 
is “thrown into” his situation: “He could run away from Dot, Gladys, his 
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mother, but he could not run away from this [his own existence]; it was he and 
he was it” (501). What meaning do those Others have in such a “No-Man’s 
Land”? In a “No-Man’s Land” there can be no man, including no new Other. 
Nonetheless, a man in this “No-Man’s Land” can objectively see the world, 
which is not a “No-Man’s Land,” and can see the presence of the Other in the 
world.
Ely Houston appears before Cross again through the narrator’s description 
of Cross’s inner agitation caused by only hearing the name of Houston just 
after Cross has managed to cover the clues that might have exposed his com-
plicity. For Cross’s innocence depends entirely upon whether the police be-
lieves in the strong possibility of Herndon and Blount killing each other. Th e 
narrator plays a key role in interpreting Cross’s feelings toward Houston and 
Cross’s self-realization of his psychological structure through this Other, 
Houston:
Houston was so placed psychologically in life that he would feel intui-
tively at home with his [Cross’s] crimes [ . . . ] he had the kind of con-
sciousness that could grasp the mercurial emotions of men whom society 
had never tamed or disciplined, men whose will had never been broken, 
men who were wild but sensitive, savage but civilized, intellectual but 
somehow intrinsically poetic in their inmost hearts. (644)
Wright succeeds in using Houston, as well as the narrator, as helpers in bring-
ing the reader to understand the structure of Cross’s psychology and in causing 
Cross to understand his own structure in terms of the Other.
When the medical examiner comes up with the theory that a third man 
may have murdered both Herndon and Blount, both Cross and Houston de-
scribe such a man in frightening terms. For Houston, such a man who is 
“‘psychologically akin to either Blount or Herndon and yet somehow outside 
of them [ . . . ] with the third set of ideas [ . . . ] that no ideas are necessary to 
justify his acts. [ . . . ] Th at man who kills like that is a bleak and tragic man’” 
(670–73). Feeling “an overpowering desire to help Houston develop his 
theory” (673), Cross concurs: “‘Th e man you are describing, [ . . . ] is one for 
whom all ethical laws are suspended. He acts like a god’” (674). Both Cross’s 
and Houston’s ways of analyzing this third man remind us of Camus’s analysis 
of criminals: “We are living in the era of premeditation and perfect crimes. 
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Our criminals are no longer those helpless children who pleaded love as their 
excuse. On the contrary, they are adults, and they have a perfect alibi: philoso-
phy, which can be used for anything, even for transforming murderers into 
judges” (Th e Rebel 11). Further, Camus asserts that understanding the mean-
ing of murder is essential for a human being to know how to act among those 
who are the Other: “We can act only in our time, among the people who sur-
round us. We shall be capable of nothing until we know whether we have the 
right to kill our fellowmen, or the right to let them be killed. Since all contem-
porary action leads to murder, direct or indirect, we cannot act until we know 
whether, and why, we have the right to kill” (12). Feeling that Houston is 
coming to realize his criminality, Cross waits to be “challenged” and to be “ac-
cused” (674), but Houston concludes that the murder must be double man-
slaughter. Like God or like a judge, Cross cannot stop with these murders 
alone. Accordingly, whether Cross has the right to kill has never burst upon 
his mind.
After Cross has killed Hilton, the Communist Party member, who justiﬁ ed 
the suﬀ ering which the Party inﬂ icted by insisting that life is, anyway, “bare, 
naked, unjustiﬁ able [ . . . ] existing there and for no reason and no end” (692), 
Cross is brought face to face with Houston. Houston posits “a third man” 
(711) involved in these killings of Blount, Herndon, and Hilton as the single 
hypothesis “that could tie all of this together” (711):
“Could there be a man in whose mind and consciousness all the hopes 
and inhibitions of the last two thousand years have died? A man whose 
consciousness has not been conditioned by our culture? A man speaking 
our language, dressing and behaving like we do, and yet living on a com-
pletely diﬀ erent plane? A man who would be the return of ancient man, 
pre-Christian man? Do you know what I mean?” (711)
Th e narrator’s analysis of Cross’s reaction to these words signals Cross’s oth-
erness toward himself and conﬁ rms Wright’s intention to present Houston as 
Cross’s alterego:
Cross felt his body grow hot. His judgement told him to keep quiet, to 
pretend ignorance; but his emotions clamored to enter this discussion, to 
tell what he knew. He drew his breath, pushed his personal feelings aside 
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and, when he spoke, he was discussing himself in terms that were dis-
placed and projected. (711)
Although Houston’s role as a helper in realizing the structure of Cross’s psy-
chology and in making Cross sure of his own psychological structure has been 
clear since his ﬁ rst appearance in the story, that role becomes more explicit 
after Houston analyzes the psychological structure of the “third man.”
IV
Camus’s L’Étranger, which was a model for Wright when he attempted to 
write his Th e Outsider as a philosophical novel, begins with the protagonist, 
Meursault, going to the funeral of his mother, who has died in an old people’s 
home. Th e scene of the burial is described objectively through the tearless eyes 
of Meursault in an unemotional manner already suggested by the perfectly 
unaﬀ ected beginning “Mother died today” (9). Th e reader is reported the 
fewest, businesslike exchanges with the Other, the fairly cool observation on 
the vigil and the elderly persons who gather to keep the vigil, the sight of the 
funeral procession to the burial site through the luminous, sun-drenched 
countryside, and so on; all of these create a very mundane, fragmentary im-
pression in the reader. Th e life of Meursault, who leads an apparently incon-
spicuous bachelor life in Algiers, is truly dull. Ambition, wealth, the love of his 
mother or a lover, religion, normally suﬃ  cient reasons for most people to live 
their lives, mean nothing to him; “didn’t mean anything” and “I didn’t mind” 
are Meursault’s most characteristic remarks. One day, his superior sends for 
him and implies his promotion to a position of higher responsibility in Paris, 
but Meursault is unmoved and he replies, “[Y]ou could never change your 
life”; “in any case one life was as good as another”; “I wasn’t at all dissatisﬁ ed 
with mine here” (44). Th ese are Meursault’s principles in life.
Meursault seems scarcely to take interest in the Other. He has rarely gone 
to see his mother in the old people’s home, his only blood relation. On the day 
of his mother’s funeral, he displays not only a lack of emotion, but also the 
inability to tell how old she is. Meursault narrates: “When she was at home, 
mother used to spend all her time just watching me in silence” (10). Meur-
sault’s relationship to his mother is succinctly and vividly shown. In the same 
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vein, when his lover Marie asks him if he loves her, he replies that “it didn’t 
mean anything but that [he] didn’t think so” (38). Meursault’s indiﬀ erence to 
those who are the Other does not mean his contempt for them at all. Th e lack 
of his sense of disdain for the Other is thoroughgoing. Although people speak 
of his next-door neighbour old Salamano’s living together with his dog, which 
has a skin disease, beating and swearing at it as “dreadful” (31), when Meur-
sault is asked “‘Isn’t it dreadful’” (32) about Salamamo, he says no. Besides, 
although Raymond Sintès, Meursault’s other next-door neighbour, is said to 
live oﬀ  women (31) and most of the people “don’t like him much” (32), even 
so he never refuses Raymond when he approaches Meursault. Meursault even 
helps Raymond to punish his mistress. Meursault never judges himself or the 
Other only by status or wealth, or by good and evil.
Meursault’s character and his relationships to the Other are based upon an 
incorrigible lack of contempt for the Other, without distinguishing those who 
are good from those who are evil. Nevertheless, he does not decline to live his 
life, nor he is incompetent in living. He works honestly, never intends to get 
into trouble with anyone of those who are the Other, including his superior, 
his neighbours, and his lover Marie. Hearing the news that his mother has 
died, Meursault does not collapse in tears, and he answers to Marie’s question 
whether he loves her as if indiﬀ erently and seemingly unfeelingly, but not be-
cause he is rebellious; rather it is natural that he should do so. Nonetheless, the 
anger of the Other toward Meursault’s natural behavior because of his saying 
what he really thinks and doing what he really wants to do astonishes him and 
leads him to recognize himself as an outsider. Th is psychological structure of 
Meursault’s relationships to the Other becomes clearer after the murder of an 
Abrabian.
After his arrest Meursault is asked by a lawyer if he felt any grief on the day 
of his mother’s funeral. Feeling it diﬃ  cult to answer the question, Meursault 
says that “[he] probably loved mother quite a lot, but that didn’t mean any-
thing. [ . . . ] Th e only thing [he] could say for certain was that [he] would 
rather Mother hadn’t died” (65). Meursault’s natural, honest way of answering 
angers his lawyer, and Meursault realizes that he makes his lawyer feel uncom-
fortable. Even so, Meursault wants to assure his lawyer that “[he] was just like 
everyone else, exactly like everyone else” (65–66). Th e candidness of Meur-
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sault, who identiﬁ es himself as “just like everyone else,” will gradually change 
through his relationships to the Other, including the examining magistrate, 
the lawyer, the jury, the journalists, the prosecutor, and the public; the more 
honestly Meursault speaks, the more they hate him; for the ﬁ rst time he real-
izes that he is guilty because he feels that these people hate him and they are 
ﬁ lled with fury. Meursault is sentenced to death for the crime.
As a condemned prisoner, Meursault refuses to see the chaplain. After his 
fourth attempt to see Meursault, one day suddenly the chaplain walks into the 
condemned Meursault’s cell. When the chaplain tells him, “‘I’m on your side. 
But you can’t see that because your heart is blind. I shall pray for you’” (115), 
Meursault explodes in anger and grabs the chaplain by the collar of his cas-
sock. He pours out his feelings “in a paroxysm of joy and anger” (115):
He [the chaplain] seemed so certain of everything, didn’t he? And yet 
none of his certainties was worth one hair of a woman’s head. He 
couldn’t even be sure he was alive because he was living like a dead man. 
I might seem to be empty-handed. But I was sure of myself, sure of 
everything, surer than he was, sure of my life and sure of the death that 
was coming to me. (115)
What are Meursault’s “joy and anger” all about? Meursault’s anger against the 
chaplain’s words “‘I shall pray for you’” assures Meursault that his life has been 
really his own and now his death is absolutely his own; Meursault does not 
want anyone to say to him, this is “for you.” If the chaplain had not said “I 
shall pray for you,” Meursault could not have attained the joy in knowing that 
he accepts his life and death as they are, and he would never had laid himself 
“open for the ﬁ rst time to the benign indiﬀ erence of the world [ . . . ]”: “I real-
ized that I’d been happy, and that I was still happy” (117). Camus’s L’Étranger 
ends with Meursault’s assertion that there surely exist those among the Other 
who hate him: “For the ﬁ nal consummation and for me to feel less lonely, my 
last wish was that there should be a crowd of spectators at my execution and 
that should greet me with cries of hatred” (117). Camus concludes that it is 
happiness for a human being to assure himself of the Being of the Other, even 
if it is to be realized by their cries of hatred.
Whereas Cross realizes the distance between his self and the Being of the 
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Other, and suﬀ ers from it and commits murder, Meursault recognizes himself 
as one embodiment of the Other and tries to get along with them, indeed had 
been doing so until his act of murder. Cross’s sense of distance is not evident 
to anyone of the Other, even to Houston before Cross’s fourth murder and 
Eva’s suicide, and Cross is always aware of some speciﬁ c feelings within him-
self toward the Other  — fear, hate, pride, shame. However, the distance is not 
a problem for Meursault and the Being of the Other itself is suﬃ  cient in 
meaning for him. Cross reﬂ ects on his life that it was terrible; Meursault re-
ﬂ ects on his life that it was happy. Although there seem to be many diﬀ er-
ences between Cross and Meursault, both of them conclude in the same way 
that the existence of the Other is necessary to them even if the Other exists to 
hate them. Both Wright and Camus seem to feel the importance of the bridge 
and the relationships which exist to tie their protagonists to the Other; hate is 
bridge enough or relationship enough to play such a role.
Th e ﬁ rst-person narrator plays the role of revealing the fact that the Other 
has already and always existed in a prerequisite way before the appearance of 
Meursault in the story, when the narrator reports what Meursault has done, 
said, heard, and thought; what he has observed those who are the Other doing 
and saying; what has been told him by those who are the Other. Th e reader 
can easily understand Meursault’s relationship to the Other. Th e limited third-
person narrator plays a role of making the reader consider or giving the reader 
time to consider how fully Wright reveals Cross’s relationships to the Other 
when the narrator reports all of the feelings or attitudes toward the Others 
experienced by Cross, who sees everything in the story, hears it, responds to it, 
thinks about it, does it or shares in it, tries to control it, or is controlled by it. 
Th ere are diﬀ erences in how solemnly Camus and Wright accept the experien-
tial fact that other people always exist as the Other, who cause one to sense his 
or her existence, identity, and self.
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